The Technology Factor in International Trade by William H. Gruber & Raymond Vernon
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Technology Factor in International Trade





Chapter Title: The Technology Factor in a World Trade Matrix
Chapter Author: William H. Gruber, Raymond Vernon
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3382
Chapter pages in book: (p. 233 - 302)I
The Technology Factor





One of the external economies that an author can draw upon in a collec-
tion of papers such as these is the expository background which the
other papers provide. Elsewhere in this collection, the reader will find
a number of accounts of the past efforts of economists to find an
efficient explanation of international trade—efficient in terms of its
ability to describe, predict, and explain the level and composition of
such trade. To relate our contribution appropriately to what has gone
before, there is no need to make more than the briefest reference to
those past efforts.
The mainstream of international trade analysis proceeds, of course,
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to Herbert Cremer for his work on the data. Gordon Kaufman's occasional
guidance on the statistical techniques used in this paper was of immense value to
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from an analytical structure identified with Ricardo, Marshall, Heck-
scher, and Ohlin, stressing comparative advantage doctrine and factor
proportions theory. It hardly needs to be said that analyses in this tra-
dition generally take consumer preferences as given, the market as
atomistic, knowledge as free and universal, the production function as
invariant, and unit costs as invariant or increasing. The composition of
trade is then explained primarily in terms of the differences in factor
proportions and consumer preferences between countries.
A number of other lines of analysis have appeared in recent years,
however, which have based their search for explanations of interna-
tional trade on rather different factors. One strand of this aberrant
tendency seeks to determine to what extent the leads and lags in tech-
nological innovation among countries determine the level and composition
of their trade;' the departures from the mainstream that are involved
in this approach usually include the assumption that technical knowledge
or skill is not a costless or universally available good and the assumption
that the possession of knowledge or skill creates a transitory advantage
for the exporting country. A second theme, not wholly dissociated from
the first, has emphasized the relation between the export performance
of a nation and a market "horizon"—including both the knowledge and
the perception of market risk—of the nation's businessmen; once again,
the new emphasis consists mainly of introducing knowledge as a hitherto
neglected variable.2 Still another approach to international trade empha-
sizes the role of economies of scale, whether internal or external, whether
in production or in marketing, as a powerful explanatory variable.3
Finally, there have been explanations that appeal to systematic institu-
tional factors, such as the parent-subsidiary relation of the buyer and
seller or the bilateral trade arrangement of the buying and selling coun-
tries. Behind these explanations there usually lies the assumption that
buyers and sellers are engaged in a trade-off between risk avoidance
and cost, forsaking the freedom to select source or market solely on a
price basis, in favor of the advantages of longer run assurances [16].
'Williams [21], Kravis [11], Keesing [7], Kindleberger [121, Vernon [181, Hirsch
[3], Wells [19], Tsurumi [17], and Stobaugh [15].
2H.G. Johnson has pointed out the introduction of skill and knowledge can
be readily accommodated within the structure of classical theory [61.
3Seethe sources cited in footnote 1, as well as: Linder [13], Linnemann [14],
Hufbauer [5], and Keesing [9].Technology Factor in World Trade Matrix235
Thepurpose of this paper is to provide grist for the mill of theory.
The analysis in the paper is based upon a matrix of world trade for
manufactured goods relating to one year, 1964. The fact that the data
are confined to manufactured goods and the fact that they relate to a
:
singleyear substantially limit the contribution one can hope to make.
f Theories that rely on comparative cost concepts to explain international
trade generally cannot be tested very rigorously unless all of the trade
of the importing and exporting countries is included in the test. And
theories that rely on leads and lags for their causation cannot be tested
very well unless they are exposed to data over periods of time. Still,
there is much that the analysis has to suggest about the relative strength
of forces underlying international trade flows.
The central question of the analysis is this: To what extent are the
international trade flows of an industry associated with the technological
aspects of the industry, and how do these associations vary according
to the countries of origin and destination of the trade flow? To explore
the question adequately, however, numerous ancillary issues have to be
investigated, including the relation between the trade of an industry and
its nontechnological characteristics.
TECHNOLOGiCAL iNPUTS AND WORLD TRADE
Before introducing the world trade matrix that is the pièce de résistance
of this paper, it will help to summarize some of the findings of earlier
studies that have an immediate bearing.
One finding of central relevance to this analysis is that, as far as the
United States is concerned, industries associated with a relatively high
"research effort" also tend to export a relatively high proportion of
their output. It does not matter very much how "research effort" is
measured, whether by industry research and development expenditures
as a percentage of industry sales, or by technical personnel as a per-
centage of total industry employment; the results are still very much the
same. Various studies done by us and by others have confirmed this
relationship [8, 2]. Table 1 extracts some data from one of our earlier
studies to illustrate the main point.
In interpreting the results in Table 1, there are a number of difficulties236 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
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as percentage of sales 6.3 0.5 2.0
Scientists and engineers
in R&D as percentage of
total employment 3.2 0.4 1.1
Export performance
Exports as percentage
of sales 7.2 1.8 3.2
Excess of exports over
imports, as percentage
of sales 5.2 —1.1 0.6
Source: IV.H. Gruber, Dileep Mebta, and Raymond Vernon [2],
Table 1, p. 23.
to be faced. One of these, as we shall have occasion to point out several
times in the course of this paper, is the fact that high R&D activity in
U.S. industry is strongly correlated with various other industry character-
istics; there is an especially close association, for example, with the
comparatively intensive use of high-level manpower in general. Accord-
ingly, one cannot readily determine whether the R&D effort of an indus-
try or its pattern of manpower use in general is the prime factor influenc-
ing the export performance of the industry. Yet for some policy
purposes, the distinction can be critical.
The statisticaltie between strong export performance and skilled
manpower use is not limited to U.S. industry alone. The same tie seems
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anceof sixty-three branches of Canadian industry demonstrates a fairly
strong association between (1) male professional and technical workers
as a percentage of total employment and (2) exports as a percentage of
domestic production [20]. More fragmentary evidence suggests that a
similar association may exist for the industries of a number of other
countries, but that the tendency weakens and may even be reversed as
one moves from developed to less-developed economies.
Itis not self-evident why R&D-intensive, skill-intensive industries
should characteristically export a relatively high percentage of their
output. All that the literature contains at this stage are fragmentary tests
of some general hypotheses, linking such behavior to issues of monopoly,
scale, and innovational lags [5, 18]. But one cannot yet exclude such
mundane explanations as the possibility that the products of such indus-
tries are of high value in relation to weight and bulk, or that they are
especiallyfree from import impediments such as hightariffs and
embargoes.
Having started these hares, it has to be acknowledged at once that
the existing data are not good enough to pursue them very far, at least
not in terms of the measures presented in Table 1. Figures on the
relationship of exports to production, broken down by industrial group-
ings that can be matched with R&D variables, are available for only a
few countries. In order to throw light on the problem from a different
direction, therefore, we turn to the analysis of the world trade matrix
that constitutes the core of this paper.
AREA EXPORT SHARES ZN WORLD MARKETS
One can think of the export trade of any area as being a function of
the economic characteristics of the industries that generate the exports.
Symbolically, for exporting country i:
j=1
where:E13k specifies the volume of exports from area I to area j in
product category k; and
a, b, c,...specifyvarious economic characteristics applicable to indus-
tries producing manufactured goods.
=
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(The introduction of j,the importing area, at this point should not
throw the reader off; it does not play an operational part in the dis-
cussion until much later and is introduced simply to permit the use of
consistent notations throughout the paper.)
When a relationship of this sort is computed separately for each of
the exporting areas in the world trade matrix, the basis has been laid for
developing two kinds of information.
One type of information is the similarities from area to area in the
export performance of industries with specified characteristics. Can one
say, for instance, that industries in which technological activity or degree
of concentration are very marked also generally have large exports,
irrespective of the characteristics of the exporting area?
Another kind of information is the differences in the export behavior
of given kinds of areas. Do capital-rich economies, for instance, sys-
tematically exhibit more prominence for capital-intensive industries in
their export mix than economies that are relatively less well endowed
with capital? More generally, does the export mix seem to be a function
of the resource endowment of the exporting country?
So much for prelude. The data developed by us for mounting this
phase of the analysis are described in Appendix A. They consist of the
1964 exports of specified manufactured goods, broken down into
twenty-four categories, from each of ten exporting areas (United States,
United Kingdom, West Germany, France, "Rest of EEC," "Rest of
EFTA," Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Brazil) to each of twelve import-
ing areas (the first eight enumerated above plus the white Common-
wealth countries, Africa minus South Africa, Latin America, and Asia.)
The choice of areas and industry breakdowns embodied the usual
procrustean compromises that research of this sort is bound to require.
Given the limitations of resources and data, we adopted a much more
highly aggregated classification system of areas and industry than is
optimal for work of this sort. As the reader will shortly see, the limita-
tions imposed by the classification of industries proved particularly
restrictive. But despite these handicaps, the results provide many insights
into the role of the technical factor in international trade.
Table 2 presents the 1964 export data separately for each of twenty-
four industries from each of the ten exporting areas. The table also















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































"Technology Factor in World Trade Matrix241
triesand sixteen other industries. As noted earlier, measures of the
intensity of research activity and measures of the intensity of use of
highly skilled manpower in general are so strongly associated that we
cannot hope to avoid the problem of collinearity in any industry
classification system.4 Accordingly, the ambiguity in the phrase "tech-
nology-intensive" may have a certain virtue, reminding the reader of
the unavoidable ambiguity in the meaning of the classification. In any
event, the eight technology-intensive industries are all those which in
1964 employed scientists and engineers in excess of 6 per cent of their
total workforce, as measured by U.S. data. To make comparisons some-
what easier for the eye, the export figures for each industry in each area
are expressed as a percentage of the total exports of manufactured goods
of that area. In the notation system used here, the figures for a given
industry in Table 2 are:
1224
j=1k=1
The eight technology-intensive industries, it is evident, are major con-
tributors to world trade totals in manufactures. As a benchmark to
measure that importance, one has only to note that they account for
almost 30 per cent of the exports of the ten exporting areas in Table 2,
even though the contribution of those industries to world output prob-
ably is well below 20 per cent. Apart from the general level of the
exports of these industries, however, one is also struck by the faithful
way in which the relative importance of the eight technology-intensive
industries declines as the eye moves across the table—that is, from the
highly developed United States, to the middle range of development
represented by Europe and Japan, and finally to the less-developed
areas represented by Mexico and Brazil.
A more systematic way of observing the similarities and differences
for the industry shares is provided by the figures in Table 3; in that
The Pearsonian coefficient of correlation for the twenty-four industries in
Table 2 between (1) scientists and engineers as per cent of total workforce and
(2) scientists and engineers in R&D as per cent of total workforce was +.97.
Both these measures also were very highly correlated with indirect labor as per
cent of total workforce.r
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table, the logs of the export shares of each of the twenty-four industries
for each exporting area are correlated with the logs of the shares of each
other exporting area in the matrix.
The figures in Table 3 demonstrate widespread similarities in the
forty-five pairs of export profiles. To be sure, the similarities tend to be
stronger when the export profiles of advanced countries are paired than
when the profiles of such countries are matched with those of less-
developed areas; the profiles of the United Kingdom, West Germany,
France, Japan, and "Rest of EEC" resemble one another more closely
than any of them resemble Mexico or Brazil. In fact, Mexico and Brazil
are somewhat less certain matches not only for the advanced countries
but even for one another. Still, the data in Table 3 suggest similarity in
export profiles more strongly than they suggest difference.
The significance of these similarities, however, must not be exagger-
ated. A part of the parallelism may be generated by such simple explana-
tions as the existence of universal frictions that prevent the export of
some kinds of products from any country. For instance, bulky products,
low in value, may be less likely to enter international trade than high-
value products, whatever the source. Or the correlations may be simply
a reflection of the industry classification system used; large industries
are likely to generate more exports than small industries if the indus-
tries are not homogeneous in product and cost structure.
In order to distinguish among these possibilities and others, some
added analysis on different lines is helpful. By relating each area's
exports in a given industry to the exports in that same industry from all
ten areas, the variations in export mix among the ten areas are more
clearly highlighted. Symbolically, the measure for analysis is:
1012
Observesome of the characteristics of this measure. If the industry
distribution of a given exporting area is exactly like the industry distribu-
tion of world exports, then for that area the measure is identical in
value for all twenty-four industries. Stated differently, variations in the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0244 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns
differences in the relative importance of the exports of these industries
for the particular area, as compared with the relative importance of
these industries in world export totals; The measure therefore captures
for each area only the deviations of that area from world export patterns.
Bearing these properties of the measure in mind, Table 4 demonstrates
that the areas which are prominent exporters of technology-intensive
products, according to our crude twenty-four-industry classification, are
also the most prominent exporters of other manufactured products. The
exports of the United States, for instance, take first place in both the
technology-intensive and the "other" group of industries; West Germany
and "Rest of EEC" share second- and third-place honors, in both groups,
and so on. But Table 4 also affirms what had already begun to be
suggested by the figures in earlier tables, namely that the technology-
intensive industries occupy an especially prominent place in the export
mix of the United States and a less-than-proportionate place in the
export mix of most areas toward the lower end of the development
spectrum.
There is a good deal more that can be ferreted out, however, regard-
ing the similarities and differences in the industry profiles of the differ-
ent areas. And as a first step in these added probes, one can repeat the
performance of Table 3, cross-correlating the export profiles of all
possible pairs of areas. This time, however, export profiles are measured
by the data in Table 4, that is, by industry-normalized, not area-
normalized, shares.
In Table 5, unlike Table 3, marked similarities in export patterns are
no longer in evidence. Quite obviously, the similarities in Table 3 are J
basedin good part on factors that are common to the industries for all
the areas rather than to the areas themselves. But some new correlations
emerge in Table 5—correlations that are much more telling for analytical
purposes.
Although the relations are not very strong and are often not significant
in a probability sense, the United States emerges as a distinctive area,
its export profile being negatively related to each of the other areas
except the United Kingdom and Canada. Canada also offers a maverick
profile; it, too, exhibits a negative relation to most other areas. For the
rest, there are interesting similarities: the United Kingdom with West


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































248 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
Brazil and Mexico bear little similarity to the advanced countries, and
no similarity to one another.
With these broad impressions as an introduction, we are ready for
the next question: Area by area, are the industry-normalized export
measures related in some systematic way to the economic characteristics
of the industries that generate the exports?
The selection of appropriate industry characteristics is,of course, here.j
critical to the exercise. The characteristics used in this analysis were clea4
intended to reflect, with fine impartiality, both the kinds of factors that
are relevant to a comparative-cost approach and those that might be Used
surrogates for monopoly effects and scale effects. They were: data.1
L, a raw-labor intensity measure—employees per dollar of value the 4
added,as reported for U.S. industry
T, a technology-intensity measure—scientists and engineers as per- in. of
centageof total employment, as reported for U.S. industry the
K, a capital-intensity measure—fixed assets as percentage of sales,
as reported for U.S. industry is nol
S, an intermediate-good specializing measure—output delivered to But
other business as percentage of total output, as reported for U.S. indus-
try Oz*
C, an industry-concentration measure—a measure based on the rela-
tive importance of the largest firms, as reported for U.S. industry The
M, a crude materials input measure—inputs of crude materials as
percentage of total output, as reported for U.S. industry.
The first three measures are intended to correspond respectively to the
three factors: labor in a raw or unimproved state; human skills embodied
in labor (sometimes referred to as human capital); and fixed capital. tion
Although the measures are defined and discussed in more detail in To I
Appendix A, one should be aware at once that they suffer from numer- are tc$
ous inadequacies and inelegancies. First of all, although some of the In rea
measures purport to reflect the intensity of different inputs in the meast4
product of the industry to which they are related, these measures are correl4
actually based on the characteristics of the industry responsible for only intensl
the final fabricating stage of the product; they are not the sum of the some
direct and indirect inputs to the product, such as might be derived from
an inversion of the national input-output matrix. Second, the measures as
-pjTechnology Factor in World Trade Matrix249
purportingto gauge inputs are inconsistent in the sense that some of
them are related to sales (S and M), while others are related to value
or added or to a conceptual equivalent (T and L). The analysis is relying—
perhaps too heavily—upon the fact that measures of this sort usually
display considerable insensitivity to greater refinement, especially at the
gross levels of industry aggregation that we have been obliged to use
here. The refinement of the industry-characteristic measures is quite
re clearly an area in which more work needs to be done.
at Another point to be emphasized is that the "industry characteristics"
used in these tests and others are characteristics based on U.S. industry
data. Just how damaging that fact may be for the analysis is not clear;
the debate over the existence and strength of factor inversions as an
element in international trade is still going on and the results are not all
in. Our use of U.S. characteristics commits us to the assumption that
the relative factor position of given industries is similar in different
countries. If this should prove to be the case, then the use of U.S. data
is not overwhelmingly disconcerting [5, App. B, pp. 115—120; 12; 4].
But some pitfalls are opened up by this limitation, a fact that requires
special care in the interpretation of the results.
On the other hand, the independent variables used in this analysis
enjoy certain elements of strength that are not immediately apparent.
The selection of these variables was the result of a tedious weeding-out
process—a process that involved as many as a dozen different industry
measures at various stages in the analysis. As a result of this process,
o theinterrelations among various industry characteristics were well
explored, adding somewhat to our sense of confidence both in the selec-
tion of variables and the interpretation of the results.
To what extent does intercorrelation exist between the measures that
are to serve as the descriptive variables for our twenty-four industries?
e In responding to this question, one has to recognize that some of the
measures—those relating to factor intensity—cannot fail to be inter-
correlated, simply because of what they purport to represent. Factor-
intensity measures purport to reflect the relative use of different inputs; if
some are used relatively heavily, others must have been used relatively
lightly. If, for instance, the product of a given industry is represented
as highly capital-intensive, then the combined use of other factors in250 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
that product should be of lower than average intensity. If not, some
major input is being wholly missed by the measures, or else there is
something wrong with the measures used.
The results of the tests for intercorrelation between the industry
variables are presented in Table 6. On the whole, the relationships in
the table show a gratifying tendency toward rationality. There is a
modest correlation between the technology-intensity measure, T, and
the capital-intensity measure, K. But none of the factor-intensity meas-
ures—L, T, or K—shows a very strong positive correlation with any
other. On the other hand, there are some strong negative correlations:
both the technology-intensity measure and the capital-intensity measure
are negatively correlated with the raw-labor measure.
There are other signs of rationality and consistency in the various
measures descriptive of the twenty-four industries. The index purporting
to measure technology intensity proves to be positively correlated with
the measure representing industry concentration—a relationship fre-
quently observed in other studies. And where a high use of raw labor
exists, the industries involved tend to exhibit a low degree of concentra-
tion. The measure for industries specializing in intermediate goods output
is positively correlated with the index of capital intensity, conjuring up
an image of steel mills and aluminum smelters; and the measure for
crude material use shows a similar tie to capital intensity, fortifying the
image. Finally,consistent with earlierstudies,the capital-intensity
measure shows no significant relation with the measure of industry con-
centration; evidently capital-intensive processes afford no sure road to
oligopoly power, at least when measured by the structure of U.S. indus-
try [2].
Although the various industry measures offer a certain satisfying
internal consistency, the reader will already have noted that they suggest
special difficulties in the clarification of a major issue. If high technology
inputs go hand in hand with high concentration, this fact is bound to
imperil any statistical effort to discern what part of the export advantage
of any given country in such industries may be due to the abundance and
low cost of the technology inputs and what part to the exploitation of
monopoly advantage. If technology intensity goes hand in hand with
industry concentration, which is cause and which effect? And which is

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.252 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
Even with that particular analytical objective in peril, however, there
is still much to be learned by comparing the export measures on which
Tables 4 and 5arebased with the characteristics of the industries to
which they are related. Table 7 presents some of the results of such
an analysis. In computing the net regressions and other data shown in
Table 7, the dependent variable subjected to analysis was, of course,
the same as that used in Tables 4 and 5, converted to log form. At the
same time, all the independent variables were also expressed in log
form. The purposes of this conversion are the usual ones. Because of
the statistical skew that is found in most of the series, the conversion
generates a distribution that is more in accord with the normal-distribu-
tion assumption of the statistical significance tests applied here. At the
4
sametime, the conversion permits the analyst to compare the apparent
influence on exports of the various industry characteristics in each of
the different exporting areas, expressing that influence in a common
unit—the unit of the elasticity concept.
One hardly needs to be reminded that as a model purporting to
explain the comparative performance of various exporting areas in U.
different products the structure in Table 7 is incomplete. Some of the
lacunae are self-evident. For instance, each exporting area confronts a U
different array of markets, remote or proximate, protected or otherwise.
Moreover, each exporting area has a different propensity for serving its
foreign markets by way of direct investment in overseas subsidiaries.
FJ
Failure to deal with these variables affects any product category differ-
ently for the various exporting areas. The indications provided by a
model such as that in Table 7 are predictably incomplete.
As it turns out, the statistical relationships shown in Table 7 prove to
have appreciable "explanatory" power for only three of the exporting
areas—the United States, Japan and Mexico—as indicated by the value
of the coefficient of multiple correlation. For all the other areas, sys-
tematic deviations from the world export profile are feeble. Ja
The fact that there is not much to be inferred from the table regarding
the export patterns of the areas just below the United States in develop-
ment, from the Unite4 Kingdom to "Rest of EFTA," is reassuring in
one sense. This result means that the industry export profiles of these
areas exhibit few tendencies that distinguish them from the world T
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TABLE 7
Net Regressions Derived from Relating Industry-Normalized Exports
of Twenty-Four Industries to Selected industry Characteristics, 1964
(Figures in parentheses under net regressions are t values;



































































































































p254 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns
here. That is what one should expect of some major group of exporters;
in this case, the fact that the exporters occupy the conceptual middle
ground in the analysis adds a little to the credibility of the interpretation
with regard to the United States and Japan.
For the United States, according to the figures, relatively high shares
of world exports are associated with a trilogy of factors: with high
technology-intensity, with low raw-labor intensity, and with low capital-
intensity. Since these intensities are not independent, there is a certain
artificiality involved in commenting on them one at a time; one should,
perhaps, confine his observations to industries incorporating the whole
syndrome. Still, it is worth noting that the labor result is consistent with
expectations. The capital result would probably have been resisted t
before the Leontief paradox was exposed; but perhaps, by now, itis
part of conventional wisdom. The strength of the technology factor is
consistent with other studies and with Leontief's solution of his paradox;
on the other hand, it is also consistent with the possibility that "tech- t
nology" is a surrogate for "oligopoly," given the existence of collinearity
between the variables.
In the case of Japan, the industry characteristics conducive to high
export shares in world markets prove to be raw-labor intensity and
capital intensity—once again, a pair of intercorrelated characteristics.
The results with respect to the raw-labor measure are as expected. Those
with regard to capital are no doubt influenced by her strong position in
a
"ferrous metals"—iron and steel—and by her weak position in many
of the industries with low capital intensity. The explanation for Japan's
strength in the capital-intensive industries may well be the converse of
the explanation for U.S. weakness: either a classical explanation of the
type proposed by Leontief, or a national capability for paying labor at
less than its marginal productivity.
The Mexican figures defy easy explanation. Without more investiga-
tion, it is not very fruitful to speculate over their meaning.
To sum up: The analysis to this point tends to confirm much of what
had generally been suspected. It supports once again the right of the
technology factor (or, since the two are not statistically separable, the
human skill factor) to be regarded as one type of factor endowment
that may contribute to an explanation of international trade flows. It
suggests, if further corroboration were needed, that the factual observa-.Technology Factor in World Trade Matrix255
tions underlying both the U.S. and the Japanese versions of the Leontief
paradox were not mere statistical aberrations. But it does not resolve
the tension between the classical and eclectic "explanations" of these
phenomena; and it offers the seeds for some new disputes over the
critical factors determining the patterns of trade.
TRADE BETWEEN AREAS
The search for an explanation of the trade performance of the tech-
nology-intensive industries is pursued here in still another direction. Up
to this point, the export figures used for analysis were for given indus-
tries from given areas, totaled for all destinations. In attempting to
understand the forces behind the trade in technology-intensive indus-
tries, however, the characteristics of the importing areas may impart as
much information as those of the exporting areas. In short, the world
trade matrix for any given industry can be viewed as a network of
bilateral trade flows whose structure is determined by various economic
characteristics of the exporting and importing areas concerned.
The approach in this section is to analyze the bilateral trade net-
works of each of our twenty-four industries in terms of selected variables
that are based on the exporting and importing areas. The object is not
only to identify the variables that help to explain the trade flows but
also to detect systematic variations in the value and direction of those
variables from one kind of industry to the next.
For any k:
log E2k = PC,, GNP1, GNP1, D5, Pt,, ,and
I I)
where:
=logof per capita income of exporting area
PC3 =logof per capita income of importing area
GNP, =logof gross national product of exporting area
GNPJ =logof gross national product of importing area
=afunction of the distance between i and]
=adummy variable representing the presence (1) or absence
(0) of a preferential trade arrangement between I and i
pr
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=logof the absolute difference between PC1 and PC,
I J= logof the absolute difference between "index of hu-
man resource development" in the exporting area (H,)
and such an index in the importing area (H5); the index,
which is based on educational attainment patterns, is
known as the Harbison-Myers index.
A more detailed description of these measures appears in Appendix A.
The first six independent variables are fairly familiar in this sort of
analysis; they are measures which have been employed by others, with
varying success, to "explain" international trade flows.5 These variables
bear a close affinity to standard gravity models, where distance and
mass are the key "explanatory" variables.
The other two variables,
j and ,aremore novel.
These variables are introduced in order to test a family of hypotheses
which hold that countries whose national environments differ consider-
ably will have a different pattern of trade relations than those whose
national environments are very much alike; and, further, that these
differences will vary systematically by the nature of the product. The
difference between the per capita incomes of any two areas,
j I,
maybe taken as a crude index of the difference in consumption patterns.
The difference in human resource development,
j ,tothe extent
that its descriptive power differs from j ,isthought of as stress-
ing the side of production. In short, the human resource level is thought
of as the measure of an input, generated by investments in education and
knowledge, whereas per capita income is related to the structure of the
economy's demands.
Despite the ambitious coverage of the independent variables, some of
the limitations previously encountered in Table 7 remain painfully
evident. The role of import barriers, including the effective tariff rates,
import licensing regimes, and other such impediments, is not explicitly
accounted for. Nor is the influence of the existence of direct investments
abroad by the industries of the various exporting countries. Our limited
resources did not permit us to try to fill these gaps, and the reader will
Linnemann [14] uses a very similar form of equation. However, he confines
his analysis principally to aggregate trade flows and only ventures tentatively into
the question of the differences in trade flows among different types of commod-
ities.I
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have to be on his guard to detect where these omissions may have led
us astray.
Before exploring the aggregate explanatory power of the variables
that were included, there is the usual indispensable threshold question:
To what extent are the independent variables intercorrelated? Table 8
sets Out a matrix of correlation values for all possible pairs of the
independent variables.
One can see at once that the variables are intercorrelated in a web of
relations, complicating somewhat the interpretation of everything that is
to follow. Not surprisingly, the logs of per capita income are positively
associated with the logs of the gross national product to which they
relate; any other result would be somewhat suspect. Distance, is
related to per capita income differences, ; where small distances
exist between countries, the per capita income differences are also small,
while larger distances are associated with larger per capita income
differences. But this relation may have no causal significance and may
simply be a reminder of the fact that seven of the eight rich exporting
areas and seven of the nine rich importing areas in our trade matrix
are relatively close together, in Europe and North America, while the
poor areas of our trade matrix are far away from most of their trading
partners.
The two measures of area differences, and ,also
exhibit some relationship to one another. But it is apparent that they are
far from being carbon copies. While there is, of course, an intimate
relation between the per capita income and the human resource develop-
ment index of any area, the correlation of the absolute differences in
these measures for pairs of areas is weak. This reflects the aberrant
behavior of several areas including Canada, Japan, and "Rest of EFTA."
Canada is on the low side as measured by the human resource develop-
ment jndex in view of its per capita income, while Japan and "Rest of
EFTA" project the opposite picture.
Regressing the logs of the trade flows on the eight variables presented
in Table 8, industry by industry, a set of twenty-four industry equations
are derived. The net regressions in these twenty-four equations for 1964
data are shown in Table 9, below, together with the value for the
multiple correlation coefficients.







Relations Between Descriptive Measures
Relating to Exporting and Importing Areas, 1964
(each cell shows Pearsonian coefficient of
correlation between indicated measures)
r
Measure PC1PC1GNP,GNP3D1 L\HjjJ








a— .07*— .02*+ .02*+ .17+ .21
log GNP
export area
+1.00— .22— .06*+ .10*+ .22
log GNP
import area

















*Indicates coefficient not significant at 5 per cent level. Although
n =114for most correlations in the table, n=10for the PC1, GNP1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.260 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
in the trade behavior of the different products, almost irrespective of
product type. The only seeming difference between the behavior of the
eight technology-intensive industries and the sixteen other industries—
and that difference feeble at best—is the explanatory power of PCI,
the per capita income of the exporting country. In this variable, con-
sistent with conventional wisdom, one detects the prevalence of a posi-
tive relation to trade levels in the technology-intensive industries and of
a negative relation in the industries at the other end of the technology
spectrum. But the relations are weak and wavering.
The fact that there are so few consistent differences between the two
groups of industries is a finding that generates very mixed reactions. As
will shortly be evident, the seeming consistency may be due in part to
the relative grossness of our industry classifications, a grossness that may
have the effect of grouping a broad band of industrial activities within
each of the twenty-four industry groups in Table 9. We shall return to
that issue later in the discussion. For the present, the consistencies
themselves are worth noting.
As indicated by many earlier studies, the distance factor, D23, has
strong explanatory power for most product classes, large distances being
associated with low trade. There is a temptation to equate the distance
factor with some simple economic equivalent, such as transport cost. But
the pervasive strength of that factor, including its appearance in such
industrial categories as "drugs" and "agricultural machinery," suggests
that more may be involved in this measure than mere transport cost.
Perhaps what one sees here is a measure that captures not only the
effect of transport cost but also the effect of other frictions associated
with distance, such as limitations on businessmen's knowledge about
sources and markets.
According to Table 9, the preference factor, P11, like the distance
factor, significantly affects the trade flows in most of the twenty-four
industry groups, conducive to higher trade levels. Here, one cannot be
surewhether the tariff treatment is the moving force, or whether the
market familiarity and market knowledge that go with the existence of a
preferential trade relation are the causal factors of the higher levels of
trade.
Table 9 also shows that irrespective of industry the size of the gross
national product of the exporting country, is strongly correlated
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withthe level of trade flows; but the size of the gross national product
e of the importing country is much more feebly and uncertainly related.
— Hypothesesthat stress the internal and external scale economies of large
countries as a source of export strength in manufactured products seem
supported by this finding.
The per capita income figures for importing countries throw added
light on the sources of trading strength. On the whole, the higher the
per capita income of the importing country, PC,, the lower its imports
of the products covered by this matrix; this is a relation, of course, that
) ispurportedly net of the GNP effects. One has to be cautious about
interpreting the meaning of the partial relationships between per capita
levels and trade flows in view of the positive correlation of the per
capita figures with the GNPdata.If the relationship is not a mere quirk
of the data, it reflects either a perverse consumption pattern for manu-
facnired goods in high-income countries or the ability of such countries
to engage in import substitution more effectively than others. On sheer
plausibility grounds, the second possibility is more appealing than the
first. If import substitution in manufactured goods is more extensive in
high-income countries, is this a phenomenon other than that of mere
scale? Does it perhaps reflect a greater capacity for high-income coun-
tries to assemble the ingredients of technology, capital, and entrepre-
• neurship, whenever the existence of a domestic market is evident?
The likelihood that scale alone may not be the critical variable in
explaining the resultsis indicated by the consistent direction in the
regression values generated by
I and .Inboth these
cases, as Table 9 indicates, large differences between importing and
exporting countries are associated with high trade levels. The tendency
is not very strong, but it is stubbornly persistent; nineteen of the twenty-
four industry groups exhibit positive net regressions both for
and for .Ifgaps in per capita income and human-resource
development between importer and exporter have any effect on the
level of world trade, that effect is to augment such trade, not to reduce
it.
How seriously is one to take the results of an analysis of this sort?
At a minimum, with an analysis so complex and a set of independent
variables so intimately interrelated, one wants to be sure of the sensitivity
of the results to different structures of the model. Two features of the262 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
model are especially bothersome: the pervasive role of per capita Tha'
income inthe specification of the independent variables; and the
unweighted character of the observations, which gives each bilateral
flow as much weight as any other in the statistical generalizations. encE
Troubled by these aspects of the model, we sought to test the persist-
ence of the principal results by altering the model in numerous ways. thatj
In one series of variants, one or more independent variables were
dropped. In another series, geographical areas that appeared at the devq
upper or lower end of the range—the United States in one variant, woul
Mexico and Brazil in another—were dropped from the analysis. Through
all of these, the major findings continued to appear: Distance and prefer- with,
ence played their usual roles. Countries with a large GNP were stronger grou1
exporters of manufactured goods than countries with small, but a large
GNP was no sure indicator of large imports. And finally and
persisted in exhibiting a mildly positive relation with trade levels and
for practically every type of product. Fi
Among the variants in the model that were tried was one that as bj
separated out the bilateral trade flows affected by preference from those
in which no preference existed. There were 17 preference-related induj
bilateral flows out of the 114 flows of the 12 x 10 matrix, resulting strati
principally from the existence of the EEC, EFTA, and the British
thecomplexity of the forces subje
at work in these preference situations, the question was whether the
tendencies manifested in the 114-pair matrix would continue to appear the
i
in the 17-pair and 97-pair matrices.
The answer is yes and no; no, in general for the 17 pairs of preference negat
relations, and yes with undiminished strength in the 97 no-preference
pairs.In the 17-pair preference group, only one or two of the explanatory with
variables show much strength. measuring the size of the exporting when
area, continued to be an important explanatory factor. But the distance a laq
variable, lost its explanatory power as did the human resource• selliri
development index. Preferential areas, it appears, have their own modus rangd
vivendi. In the 97-pair no-preference group, however, all of the explana- instal
tory variables took on added strength and pervasiveness among the accot
industry groups. but fi
Still another decomposition of the 114 bilateral flows was suggested cent
by the strong hints of significance of as an explanatory variable, an unTechnology Factor in World Trade Matrix263
a That variable,itwill be recalled, seemed to bear a slight positive
e relation to trade flows, even for technology-intensive products. The
ii possibility that differences in human resource development levels might
encourage exports from the more highly developed to the less developed
areas seems plausible enough. One might also entertain the possibility
that, at least for certain kinds of products, human resource differences
encourage trade to flow from the less developed to the more highly
c developed areas. But it seems improbable a priori that the trade stimulus
t, would be similar in intensity and direction for all types of products.
Ii In order to sort out the influence of the human resource measure
with somewhat greater clarity, export flows were separated into two
r groups: those that represented an "upward" flow, from areas with low
e human resource indexes to areas with higher indexes; and those that
moved in the opposite direction. There were 61 flows of the first sort,
S and 53 of the second, making up the usual 114-flow total.
From other compilations of the underlying data—compilations derived
as by-products of the first main part of this study—a good deal was
e already known or easilyinferred regarding the differences inthe
industrial mix of exports. High-income areas, as Table 2 had demon-
g strated, had a heavier representation of technology-intensive goods in
I their total export mix than lower-income areas. Beyond that,if one
S subjected the measures in Table 4 to systematic analysis, one could
demonstrate that the high-income areas showed a positive tie between
r the prominence of a given industry in their export profile and the
technology intensity of the industry, whereas that tie was absent or even
negative for the low-income areas.
On the basis of various exploratory compilations done in connection
with the first section, it also had been learned that any exporting area
when selling down the income ladder to lower-income areas displayed
a larger stress on technology-intensive goods in its export mix than when
selling to areas of similar or higher income. In the case of the middle
range of developed countries from the United Kingdom to Japan, for
- instance,itis known that the eight technology-intensive industries
accounted for 19.8 per cent of their total exports to the United States,
but for 27.8 per cent of their total exports to each other, and 30.7 per
cent of their total exports to the less developed areas. Could one add to
an understanding of the forces affecting upstream and downstream trade-ç
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by reference to the variables in Table 9? The data in Table 10 provide
some glimmerings of an answer.
The first impression to be drawn from Table 10 is the marked
similarity in the results between the 61 "downstream" trade flows and
the 53 "upstream" flows.
Observe the contribution of the gross national product of the
exporter, in the two groups of cases. In both instances, a large GNP
is strongly related to a high level of exports; for most industries, whether
or not they are technology-intensive, the size of the exporting economy
is important in determining the level of exports.
Note, too, the persistence in the tendency for per capita income in
the importing country, PC3, to be associated negatively with trade flows,
both for upstream and for downstream trade flows. There is a suggestion
in the table that this tendency is stronger in the eight technology-
intensive industries than in the sixteen others; if that is so, the hypothesis
that the negative correlation may reflect a greater capability of high-
income countries for import substitution gains a bit more credence.
Finally, Table 10 tells us that the size of the income gap and the
size of the human resource gap between exporter and importer continue
mildly but persistentiy to be related to the level of bilateral trade
flows. These tendencies seem somewhat weaker in the downstream trade
of the technology-intensive industries than in the upstream trade in
those industries; but there are no other clear differences in relative
impact.
In terms of classical theory, there is no great surprise in the fact that
exporting countries should find an especial affinity with markets most
different from themselves in per capita income and human resource
characteristics. What is difficult to accept is that this tendency should
exist even for upstream exports in technology-intensive products. In
this case, no doubt, we are the victims of the grossness in the system
of industry classification on which the analysis is based. One strongly
suspects that if the data could be broken down adequately, the products
being exported upstream under the "technology-intensive" label would
be a fairly standardized,relatively uncomplicated type of product,
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On looking back at the various provocative indications afforded by iI
the models, two generalizations stand out. One is the explanatory power tJ
of some of the forces that are implicit in the gravity model; large
exporters (but not necessarily large importers) generate large trade ti
flows, but the frictions associated with distance dampen down such
flows. The other conclusion relates to the explanatory power of the w
quality of labor. To plagiarize and modify Ricardo, the data may be
displaying the dominance of an exchange of brain-created goods for
brawn-created goods. As suggested by the analysis presented earlier, th
differences in capital and resource availability may be of less importance. ra
Perhaps nations inadequately endowed with capital and natural resources re
can substitute for these to some extent or import them if necessary, nc
without much loss of competitive position [cf. 1]; but it may be more dc
difficult to substitute for a lack of highly skilled manpower and more mi
uneconomic to substitute for a lack of unskilled labor. fib
fei
STATIC AND DYNAMIC FACTORS CO
ar
In interpreting the findings in this paper, one has constantly to recall
that the findings have nothing to say about the temporal sequence of
events—that they represent simply and unabashedly a cross-sectional
analysis of world trade relationships. Sometimes the researcher has no de
choice but to try to infer what may happen over time by exploiting the
indications provided from cross-sectional data. In international trade, aci
however, that kind of exercise seems especially hazardous.
mc
One major difficulty with moving from static to dynamic concepts sta
in international tfade has to do, as usual, with the temporal inter- the
dependence of critical variables.
The patterns of trade in an early time period may have a great deal
to do with the strength of the independent variables in the period that
follows. Because trade has expanded in the past, the frictional effects
of distance upon future trade may decline and the lubricating effects of
of 1
preferencesmay increase.
Moreover, although trade may be thought of as a substitute for the Tra
movement of the factors in any given time period, it may also be a
stimulant for the movement of those factors in the periods that follow;
investment may follow the market, and human resources may follow the
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investment.Trade in one period, therefore, may be the instrument for
by the displacement of trade in the periods that follow.
'wer Although one has to proceed with caution in applying static observa-
tions to dynamic concepts,itispossible to reconcile the temporal
sequences suggested by dynamic product-cycle or market-cycle theories
the with the static cross-sectional snapshot presented here.
be As various dynamic models suggest,it may well be that when
for manufactured products first enter international trade, they tend to find
her their initial export markets in areas very like that of the exporter,
nce: rather than in areas that differ markedly from the exporter in human
rces resource development terms. Our results suggest, however, that this is
ary, no more than a transitional stage; eventually, imports are cut back by
tore domestic production and the exporter moves on to other more remote
tore markets. What endures in international trade seems to be the commodity
flows that are based on gross differences in factor endowments, dif-
ferences not readily bridged by the regroupment of local factors in new
combinations or the import of foreign factors to supplement those that
are in local short supply.
call One can speculate that the factors relating to human resource develop-
of ment are especially hard to replace or supplement where they are
'nal inadequate. The capabilities that go with a high level of human resource
no development, whether applied through cost and price or through
the monopoly power, may be difficult to match; and the capabilities that
de, accrue from an adequate supply of raw labor may also be among the
more enduring advantages of a trading nation. If that is so, then, the
pts static cross-sectional pattern of world trade may well be dominated by
.er- these relatively intractable factors.
eal
hat APPENDIX A
•cts . . . .
f
This appendix deals with the sources and methods of compilation
of the trade data, the industry data, and the area data used in the study.
the Trade data
Tradedata were taken from OECD, Statistical Bulletins, Series D,
the Numbers 1 to 6 for January to December 1964; and the United Nations,268 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns




Apparel and related products
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing



















1964. The following conversion of SITC to SIC categories was used:
Food and kindred products
SIC SITC
20Total food shipments(0)minus
nonmanufactured food (041, 043,
044, 045, 051) plus beverages
(111, 112)
21 122
22 651 minus 651.6, synthetic fibers,
652, 653, 654, 655, 657
841, 842, 656








drugs 28 minus 283
Petroleum and coal products29
Rubber and plastic
products n.e.c. 30
Leather and leather products 31
Stone, clay, and glass 32
Ferrous metals 331, 332
33 minus
(331 + 332)

















5, 231, 65.6, minus 541
332
621, 629, 893
611, 612, 831, 85
661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666
671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677,
678, 679
681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687,
688, 689
691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697,
698
711, 712, 714, 715, 717, 718, 719
357 714
712
711, 715, 717, 718, 719
722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 729, 891.1,
891.2
37 731, 732, 733, 734, 735
734
731, 732, 733, 735







Other transport37 minus 372
Instruments and related
productsTechnology Factor in World Trade Matrix269
mber Country groupings provided by the OECD were used in those cases
where it was possible. A number of difficulties were encountered in
theEnglish and French texts. In a
few cases, subtraction of figures for West Germany and France from
ninus the EEC total left a negative value for the rest of EEC. Similar difficulty
043, occasionally appeared in the subtraction of U.K. data from EFTA
rages totals. Such cases, however, were infrequent and involved small volumes
of trade. When this occurred, a value of 0 was assumed. Some U.S.
ibers, exports in industries 36 and 372 were unspecified as to destination; it
was assumed that these were exports of defense products and that they
were distributed to Asia, 60 per cent, Latin America, 30 per cent, and
Africa, 10 per cent. In some cases, data were available on an exporter
basis and in other cases on an importer basis. Where observations were
separately available both for the exporter and for the importer, the
differences were not always consistent in an obvious sense. Some of the
unexplained variance in the statistical analysis must be attributed to the
poor quality of the data.
"Africa" includes all of Africa except South Africa. "Latin America"
includes Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking areas of South and
Central America, and of the Caribbean and Mexico; it does not include
non-Spanish-speaking or non-Portuguese-speaking Caribbean, Central
677, and South American territories. "Asia" includes all of Asia and the




The number of scientists and engineers, by industry, is from: Bureau
719 of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1418, Employment of Scientific and
Technical Personnel in Industry, Washington, 1964, Table A-14.
Total employment by industry is from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Bulletin No. 1312—4, Employment and Earnings Statistics for the United
States, 1909—1966, Washington, 1964.
1.1, Value added by industry is from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census
of Manufactures: 1963, Washington, 1968.
The capital/output ratio was calculated from data in FTC-SEC
Quarterly Financial Reports. Capital was defined as net property, plant
and equipment; output as sales. The data for two industries was not
available from the FTC-SEC reports. Office machines were calculated270 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
from the annual reports of Control Data and SCM; agricultural equip-
H ment from the annual reports of International Harvester and John
Deere & Co.
The industry concentration measure was calculated from Census of
ins
Manufactures: 1963. Each industry value was based upon the share of cc
total industry shipments held by the largest eight firms. Four-digit SIC
data were weighted by shipments and summed to create the variables
t
I
atthe two-digit and three-digit level used in the study.
Intermediate output, crude materials input, and the output by industry
usedin the intermediate goods specialization and crude materials input tel
La measures were calculated from: "The Transactions Table of the 1958
Input-Output Study and Revised Direct and Total Requirements Data,"
Survey of Current Business, September 1965, pp. 33ff. Definitions of
crude materials input and intermediate goods output were taken as
given, with one exception: Although the output of SIC 241 appears in
the original source as an intermediate output, it was reclassified as a
crude material input for the paper industry.
Country data Ch
GNP and population figures were taken from Table 3 of Gross
National Product; Growth Rates and Trend Data, Washington, AID,
1967, pp. 8—14. For this purpose, "Latin America" is: Costa Rica, El
trH
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile,Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. Re4
"Africa" includes: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rhodesia, vol
Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia; note the omission of a
few important countries including Egypt and Algeria. "Asia" includes:
Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, for
Burma, China (Taiwan), Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand; note
that Indonesia is omitted.
E
The human resource development index is defined by its authors as
the "arithmetic total of (1) enrollment at second level of education as Tra
a percentage of the age group fifteen to nineteen, adjusted for years
of schooling, and (2) enrollment at the third level of education as a
percentage of the age group, multiplied by a weight of 5." See F.
iTechnology Factor in World Trade Matrix271
iP- Harbison and C. A. Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth,
hn New York, 1964, pp. 31—48, for a more detailed definition of the
index and some correlations between the index and other measures of
of economic development.
of EFTA, EEC, LAFTA, the British Commonwealth preference, and
IC the French Union preference determined the preference classification.
les Distance in miles was used to create a distance-from-exporter-to-
importer index. Where possible, the midpoints of regions were used as
try terminal points. Distances were measured in one-thousand-mile units.
)ut Land distances were weighted by a factor of 2. Values less than1
58 were assigned a value of 1, and those over 10 a value of 10.
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Tin
I should like to make a few comments on Mr. Hufbauer's excellent
of paper.
(1) The attempt at running comprehensive tests, using a common
set of data, for a variety of competing "theories" of trade patterns is
welcome. However, I find Hufbauer's use of U.S. coefficients for other
)nal countries quite difficult to accept. While it is true that we have to work
with the "best" data that are available, itis not true that we do not
rent have the kinds of coefficients required by Hufbauer for his many
countries. For example, we do have data (even if not fully comparable
with U.S.) on skills in different activities for countries such as India.
It would be worthwhile for Mr. Hufbauer to work through his exercises
by actually using the coefficients of at least one other country and
examining how far the use of U.S. coefficients everywhere biases his
results. Ultimately, we can develop confidence in his results only if the
coefficients used are those actually obtained from these other countries.
(2) Further checking of his other statistical indices would also be
useful. For example, his estimate of the scale factor in different industries
(for the United States)is admittedly open to extremely serious, and
in my judgment overriding, objections. But here also, I suspect that
Hufbauer could try to improve his results by comparing his statistical
results, at the least, with the results derived with superior techniques
by economists such as Stigler (who uses the "survival" technique),
Haldi, and Manne.
(3)Itshould also be noted that Hufbauer uses only "direct"
coefficients in his tests.274 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns
(4) The work on "human capital" in international trade has been sim)
carried out by Bharadwaj and Bhagwati for India's pattern of trade and poll
by Roskamp and McMeekin for West Germany, in addition to Peter
Kenen and Elinor Yudin for the United States. Merle (Yahr) Weiss' '1
introduction of "human capital" in the estimation of C. E. S. production
functions, yielding elasticities of substitution close to unity and hence alni
reversing the conclusions of Minhas, is also relevant, of c
(5) Finally, while Hufbauer isto be congratulated for bringing this
Leontief's exercise up to date, I would like to record my student B. R. mul
Hazari's comment that a full test of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in a I
multicommodity system requires that each exportable commodity from are
the United States should have a higher capital/labor ratio than each
importable commodity. Working with aggregate capital/labor ratios for rela
exports and imports as groups would not be an adequate test. Thus, even to ti
if the latter test were passed, the stricter test may not hold at a significant has
level; but if the former test were failed (as in the paradox), clearly the rela
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The studies by Hufbauer an4 by Gruber and Vernon, forall the of I
dissimilarities in their methods and approaches, complement each other on
very effectively. Together they mention and attempt to test, explicitly mci
or implicitly, virtually the whole bewildering array of explanations that whi
are now competing in trying to account for international trade in pati
manufactures. The main results of each paper help, it seems to me, to alre
confirm the same general picture of the causes of trade; yet the dif- thel
ferences in interpretation and emphasis leave us free to describe this
picture in many alternative ways. Indeed, it is striking that the authors resc
of ten manage to give the same strands of contemporary thinking mei
decidedly different conceptual and empirical twists. tha.t
I think the most striking joint implication of the two papers is that, knq
at least at an operation level, we can no longer go back to any single,Comments 275
een simple explanation of trade. Our new findings have been pushed to the
and point where we are now irreversibly aware of several basic, real-life
beter causes operating in combination.
eiss' The strong roles in trade of natural resources, distance and prefer-
tion ences, which the Gruber-Vernon study helps to confirm, would seem
almost trivially obvious in terms of microeconomics, except for the role
of distance in products for which transport costs are minor. To explain
ging this, as others have suggested, may require an information or corn-
• R. munication approach to the subject.
in a The most obvious challenges for theory, and ultimately for policy,
rom are the other apparent causes of trade. These are not only all highly
•ach interrelated, but, perhaps even more significant, they are all intimately
for related to the growth and development process. I am tentatively inclined
yen to think of these would-be explanations in three clusters: the first group
:ant has to do with human resources, skills, and education; a second group
the relates to scale economies, external economies, total national income,
and the dimensions (including the demand characteristics) of national
markets; and the third group, elusive to formulate in parallel with the
others, relates to R&D, innovation, new products, standardization, and
levels of technological development. I suspect that the information and
communication side of trade, if we were to investigate it further, would
also prove to be related in none-too-simple ways with development,
skills, scale, and technology.
I am not optimistic about our ability (1) to sort out these causes
the of trade or (2) to unify them into an operationally meaningful theory,
her on the basis of empirical and theoretical work focused on trade itself.
itly Indeed, I expect that within a few years we will have largely exhausted
hat what can be done to map the causes of trade which are based on trade
in patterns together with commodity characteristics. The main outlines are
to already becoming clear from the two papers we are considering and
hf- their empirical predecessors.
his Rather, I would like to suggest. that the challenge must ultimately be
ors resolved through the unifying effect of advances in growth and develop-
ing ment theory, which will probably take a long time to be realized. So
that the really central challenge for empiricists is to build up a detailed
at, knowledge of the technical interrelationships underlying growth and
development. Trade theory is foredoomed to become an extension of276 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
growth and development theory; but the latter is still struggling toward when
its first successful synthesis. Until we possess adequate models of the the
growth and development process, trade theory will remain a temporary matter I
patchwork spread over a void and the sense of crisis and general
dissatisfaction that now pervades the field will continue. It
Turning to the individual papers, Professor Hufbauer has done a
remarkably ingenious job of devising new quantitative proxies for Which
economies of scale,first tra4e date, and standardization. There are profes
obvious shortcomings in each of his novel measures; but these measures theory
can probably be combined with others, derived from other countries be a
and approaches, to quantify these concepts better in the future. Speari
Hufbauer's biggest problems arise out of the underlying associations betwe
among the various commodity characteristics which he tries to measure, counti
and the overlaps in the theories and the proxies he uses for them, of
Three-digit rank correlations between his characteristics, which he used only
originally on an unweighted basis,fail to show the real degree of
multicollinearity among the explanations themselves. The bulk of world even
trade in manufactures consists of machinery, electrical machinery, certain when
types of transport equipment, and complex chemicals—a few trade I
categories in all—in which the industries at one and the same time are and
veryskill-intensive, involve substantial scale economies, produce a large versid
proportion of new, unstandardized products, and conduct much R&D. to
The pattern of trade in these products, both absolutely and compared
to other manufactures, reflects quite consistently the trading countries' such
levels of development and their economic size. exten
I write these comments before seeing Hufbauer's revisions; but I is ear
trust that he will have explored further both the underlying associations linear
I have just mentioned and the very high correlations in the relative parti)
standings of countries when his various commodity characteristics are with
applied to the same trade flows. These patterns of association, to judge for w
by my own experiments with his data, turn out to be rather different of th
according to whether rank or linear correlations are used. On a linear Or
basis, for example, capital per man performs substantially worse than ingen
the other explanations; wages per man cease to be the "best" performer;
and the ratio of consumer to intermediate goods does quite a fair job,
despite the weakness of the underlying "theory." In either sort of
E
correlation,at any rate, there are some intriguing mysteries. For example, bauerComments 277
ward when applying his measure of scale economies to exports, why should
the the results correlate very closely with GDP per capita? Why, for that
rary matter, do his results for scale economies correlate so well with his
neral results for standardization?
It must also be seriously questioned whether some of his proxies,
tie a borrowed from other people's studies, correspond to the theories to
for I whichhe relates them. It is certainly conspicuous that Hufbauer regards
are professional and technical workers in an industry as a measure of a skill
iures theory of trade, while Gruber and Vernon consider the same proxy to
tries be a measure of their "R&D factor."' Again, the high, unweighted
Spearman rank correlation of .920 (not shown in the Hufbauer article),
ions between Hufbauer's export results with U.S. wages per man and a
;ure, country's GDP per capita, does not necessarily confirm a skill theory
lem. of trade; for, in practice, U.S. wages per man in an industry reflect not
ised only the skills and education of the labor force, but also the industry's
of success in terms of R&D and new products, economies of scale, and
orid even trade itself. After all, U.S. labor is not averse to raising wages
tam when profits permit.
rade I for one cannot get excited about Hufbauer's new evidence on capital
are and the Leontief paradox. It seems to me that the physical capital
arge version of the .Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory is almost irrelevant
&D. to observed trade patterns, probably because both financial capital and
ired capital goods are far more mobile internationally than other key inputs
ries' suchasskills,technical knowledge, organizational know-how, and
externalities from the surrounding economy. Hufbauer's capital measure
itI is easily the worst of his seven "explanations" of trade, at least on a
linear-quantitative basis. That he got a positive result at all is at least
tive partly because he used capital per man, which is positively associated
are with skills, R&D, and the like, rather than capital relative to output,
dge for which this association is blurred because of the productivity effects
ent of the other factors.
Lear One last point on this paper:although Hufbauer has done an
han ingenious job of trying totest Linder's hypothesis with countries'
aggregate trade data, the job really calls for data on bilateral trade
ob, flows, along the lines of Gruber and Vernon's matrix. It seems to me
of .
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that their Tables 8, 9, and 10 shed a good deal of light on the under-
lying question. As I read this evidence, Linder's explanation will scarcely
survive as a single or separate theory of trade; but his hypothesis has
helped to call attention to distance, scale, and market size effects that
are extremely important in practice.
Gruber and Vernon's paper really reports two different empirical frami
studies, the first climaxing with Table 7 and the second with Tables 9 inde
and 10. The paper is ingenious and well written, and the findings are that
very suggestive, especially those of the second empirical study. The
empirical tests and findings are not linked to theory with the same
explicitness and rigor as in Hufbauer's study; but an even wider range that
of theories are implicitly tested, and the results present intriguing further all
challenges for theory, while complementing Hufbauer's in many ways.
I have a number of qualms about their first empirical study as it was I
originally presented.I am not clear, much less convinced, of the Gruli
theoretical basis for selecting advertising intensity, intermediate good using
specialization, and industry concentration as characteristics to be tested
in Tables 6 and 7. I would rather see these characteristics dropped impa
and a proxy for scale economies included instead.2 Let
I am even more bothered by methodological aspects of the regressions by
shown in Table 7, where the dependent variable is the country's share whid
of the ten areas' total exports. Since each country's share is negatively
related to the other countries' shares, the regression results for one
country are not independent of those for the next one; and the result
is that for any characteristic one or two countries tend to be on each we
opposing side, while most wind up with inconclusive results in the the
middle. Moreover, since export characteristics turn out to be a function muc
of levels of industrial development,itis hardly surprising that for one
several areas that fall into the weighted middle of the Gruber-Vernon
sample in terms of income, namely the Unite4 Kingdom, the rest of
EFTA, and Canada, no independent variable significantly explained their
trade-share patterns. Surely there are ways around this problem. At indul
the very least, regressions such as these should be attempted on other
measures of trade shares, such as a country's share of an industry's
exports when U.S. exports are excluded and more poor countries are a
2 Editor's note: The final version of the Gruber-Vernon paper ispartially
responsive to this criticism. protiComments 279
included; or, perhaps even better, a country's exports of the product
relative to the exports of countries with higher and lower per capita
incomes.
at Their second study yields extremely interesting results. My only serious
reservations relate to the implicit nature of much of their theoretical
ii framework and to the presence in Tables 9 and 10 of so many separate
9 independent variables related to income. This is especially serious in
re that income is a good proxy for not only demand but many supply
he conditions associated with development. I consider it a forceful testi-
monial to the strength of the many trade effects linked with development
ge that so many significant coefficients appeared for these variables, despite
er all the underlying multicollinearity.
Let me add that, against the background of the existing literature,
as I find quite exciting Hufbauer's effects with scale economies and the
Gruber-Vernon effects with total national income, as well as their results
)d using differences in the Harbison-Myers index.
ed This large-scale testing of theories has many of us wondering which
ed important explanations of trade might have been overlooked up to now.
Let me therefore call attention here to the case of Israel, as discussed
ns by Seev Hirsch in a later paper in this volume. In that country—in
re which rather impressive human resources have been thrown together
recently and are now being combined into new organizations—export
ne success in complex, skill-intensive products seems to be taking much
1k longer than in simple, standardized products. This helps to suggest that
ch we might build a useful line of theory around organization-building and
he the theme that the capabilities of a productive organization can be
on much more than the sum of the factors it employs. In such an explanation
or one would want to combine somehow Arrow's learning by doing,
on Leibenstein's X-efficiency, and Gabriel's corporate skills. Organization-
of building and learning effects would seem to me to be most important in
eir technologically complex, R&D-intensive, fast-changing,skill-intensive
At industries. Unfortunately, however, it may prove impossible to define
ier such an approach so as to be operational and measurable.
y's Together the Hufbauer and Gruber-Vernon papers should stand as
tre a landmark in our empirical research; but there is still room for con-
siderable further research along similar lines. In view of the identification
lily
problems implied by their results, the point will soon be reached where280 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns
we will need to test such relationships by applying advanced econometric
methods to explicit alternative systems of equations.
I have already suggested, however, that, by their nature, studies of
the relationships among trade patterns and commodity characteristics
cannot give us anything like a unifying explanation of trade patterns.
Success in achieving such an explanation will only come, I expect,
through empirical and theoretical advances in our understanding of the
basic technical interrelationships underlying development. Given the
difficulty of this task, it will probably be a long time an4 a lot of work
before we can put the Humpty Dumpty of trade theory together again.
C. P. KINDLEBERGER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The papers before us are in the new but distinguished tradition of
using the capacity of the computer for massive manipulation of numbers
to verify the theory of international trade, and in particular to see
which of a variety of competing theories dominates the explanation of
trade in manufactures. The authors think the time ispast for the
identification of possible theories or taxonomy. As Hufbauer says of
the new theories: "They often perform very well when applied to a
single group of commodities or a limited range of countries." But some
theories must be better than others, and some one theory must be best.
So our authors pile up the numbers for selected countries and areas,
arranged overall in one case and in matrix form in the other, and we
are off.
There is no faulting the ambition or the technical virtuosity of our
authors. I admire the first and envy the second, even though I am
not always clear what some of the manipulations imply in detail. It is
useful to test our theories empirically, even though it seems impossible
at this stage of our knowledge and data to establish any one theory as
dominant, or even to disprove much.
My scepticism about proving a great deal about the theory of trade t
from manufacturing data goes back a long way to the "proofs" of qComments 281
comparative advantage put forward by MacDougall, Balassa, and Stem,
and based on the Ricardian labor theory of value. In these cases, a
discarded theory was proved by empirical demonstration, using bilateral
trade and trade of two similar countries with third countries. The proofs
seemed to satisfy few observers, neglecting as they did the contribution
of capital to comparative advantage and omitting such industries as
chemicals. The Leontief paradox moved the discussion back to the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model with variable factor proportions.
The Leontief paradoxical results showing that United States exports
were labor-intensive and imports capital-intensive, produced an explosion
in the theory of trade, despite little agreement on the explanation of
the untoward results. Agreement is lacking between the Hufbauer and
the Gruber-Vernon papers on this point, since Hufbauer's results confirm
the Leontief findings only for the United States and restore the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson findings with respect to capital and wages
for other countries (How reconcile with Ichimura and Tatemoto for
Japan, and with Roskamp for Germany?), while Gruber and Vernon
seem to find capital out of line throughout their world trade matrix.
s Hufbauer classifies seven explanations of trade, six orthodox and
e converging, and one, that of Linder, heretical. The orthodox explanations
If are grouped into a neofactor proportions account, combining human
e and physical capital, and a neotechnological account relying mainly on
economies of scale, product innovation, and product differentiation;
a Linder's is a preference-similarity theory. It is not clear, however, that
the neofactor and the neotechnological theories converge analytically.
t. Neofactor proportions theories assume that there is a standard world
technology and that factor endowments determine the direction of
trade. Neotechnological theories assume that technology is continuously
changing unevenly, and that these changes alter the trade pattern.
ir Innovations lead to exports; the spread of technology to the world
establishes a pattern based on factor proportions, which may or may
is not differ from that induced by the initial gap. To the extent that the
le pattern based on factors differs from that based on innovation, the
Is neof actor and neotechnological explanations differ rather than harmonize.
The papers, it should be noted, discuss only one sort of technological
le theory, when there are in fact two. Innovation can take place in product
or in process. The authors here identify technical change with newI
r
282 Hypothesesand Tests of Trade Patterns
products rather than with producing old products in new and lower-cost
ways. The widespread disdain among empiricists today for factor
reversals is based on the same view. There is strong evidence to support
the position, as Lary has shown in his work, but it cannot be ruled out
by assumption. We know that factor reversals exist in some fields, as
in rice which is produced in labor-intensive ways in the Far East, but
the United States, using capital-intensive methods of sowing and fertiliz-
ing from aircraft and harvesting by outboard motorboat, is today its
leading world exporter. And itiswell to remember the work of
Tyzynski who corrected the results of the German Enquête Ausschuss
of the 1920's which emphasized new goods with high income elasticity
as a source of trade growth, by pointing to the Japanese case which the
earlier data had overlooked. In addition to the commodity and country
effects taken to be high for "new products," based on goods, incomes,
and income elasticities, there is the competitive effect which may be
based on process innovation in old goods.
It may be noted that within the field of product innovation the product-
cycle theory emphasizing supply and the Linder theory focusing on
demand may each either explain trade or trade's drying up. Assume that
technology spreads abroad. Direct investment may substitute for trade
as a means of holding the market against local competition and may
stop there. Trade is cut off, rather than reversed. In this instance it is
hard to see how aggregated trade data can prove or disprove such a
theory. In Linder's theory, rising incomes in a country may induce con-
sumers to shift to products which are too expensive for the export
market, i.e., American-type large cars which suit the home market but
are too big and too voracious as consumers of taxed gasoline for the
foreign market. Exports of large cars decline. Imports of small cars,
however, reflect the demand for a different product, the second or third
car in a family, which has a different income and price elasticity from
the first car. The Linder theory can thus be used in slightly different
circumstances to explain flourishing trade between countries on the
same level of living, or a decline in such trade when incomes pass
through certain zones. Rank-order correlations which fail to account for
the distances between incomes will miss this possibility.
Let me now raise some technical problems. Both papers rely on cross-
sectional analysis. Gruber and Vernon apologize for using the matrix ofComments 283
)st a given year to verify a dynamic model of trade. Hufbauer is uncon-
or cerned with the problem. If, however, different commodities find them-
)rt selves at different stages of the product cycle, it is not clear what the
'Ut average position portrays. One should normalize by the stage of the
as product cycle, and this cross-section data do not do. To measure the
ut average height of a family with children of various ages produces no
iz- interestingresult.
its Both papers use United States coefficients widely and apologize for
of the practice. Hufbauer uses national attributes in his Table 4, but all
ss except one of the product characteristics in his Table A-2 are of United
ty States origin. This raises fundamental questions when it comes to
measuring foreign industries. With no factor reversals and identical
•Y production functions, factor-input ratios may be compared only on the
S, assumption of identical factor prices. None of these conditionsis
guaranteed. There is something of a presumption of no reversals on the
basis of Lary's work, as I have said, but identity of production func-
t. tions is excluded by the product-cycle hypothesis, and identical factor
returns can be eliminated by casual empiricism. Gruber and Vernon
it particularly have trouble, it seems to me, when they assume that the
same industries are research-intensive all over the world, and the same
y industries advertising-intensive. In fact, they express surprise that Japan
(S does so well in advertising-intensive industries and seek to explain it by
a implicit theorizing to the effect that Japan compensates for lack of
- advertisingby cutting costs—a hint of innovation in process rather than
product which is otherwise missing from both papers.1
t I also find unsatisfactory the implicit theorizing which adduces a
e new explanatory variable, the propensity to apply marginal pricing, to
explain why the United States exports little and Japan a great deal in
capital-intensive industry. This variable may differ from country to
1 country, along with other sociologically and economically determined
propensities which affect foreign trade, such as readiness to apply
tariffs in periods of falling prices (Germany, France and Italy did so
in wheat in the 1880's, but Denmark, Britain and the Netherlands did
t
not); or business propensity to push exports in periods of slack domestic
1 Editor's note: The references to advertising intensity, which appeared in the
conference version of the Gruber-Vernon paper, were eliminated in the final
version.
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business, which is remarked to be high in Germany and low in the
United States. But such explanations must not be introduced casually
to explain away statistical results which depart from a priori expecta-
tions. If they are to be used they must be addressed explicitly and the
basis for national differences demonstrated.2
In Hufbauer's paper, dating and standardization present particular
problems. One can sympathize with the problem of trying to find
intellectually satisfactory measures for these concepts on a world basis, Dl
butwhy limit the United States data, if one is restricted to a single coun-
try, to exports? The addition of imports would have helped, especially irq
for the standardization coefficients. Hufbauer notices that cotton textiles wil
a priori seem satisfactory in standardization but curious in first date.
To limit unit values to 1965 exports eliminates cotton gray goods from qu
the standardization index, the most important single item in world
cotton-textile trade. It may even be that the United States did not export wi
gray goods in the period since 1917, although, of course, it has imported Ca
them.First-date averages by countries in Table 2 seem very odd indeed, ex
with no country having an average composition of 1965 exports earlier st:
than 1944 and the latest country average coming only to 1948. It seems it.
hard to say anything interesting about the product-cycle or technological ta
gap theories of trade with data which average out most of the timing
differences between countries and produce sixteen out of twenty-four
averages in two years, 1946 and 1947. ifl
Gruber and Vernon try to allow for distance, while Hufbauer apolo- al
gizes for leaving the problem alone. But the Gruber-Vernon solution is
not completely satisfactory for it fails to distinguish those goods (weight-
losing or bulk-gaining) in which distance inhibits trade and those foot-
loose industries in which it does not. The distance factor is important
go
both for petroleum and coal and for furniture and fixtures. But what
can one make of identical net regressions in Table 9 for drugs, on the
one hand, and stone, clay and glass, on the other (— .005) and (—.567)? d
If more than physical distance is meant (i.e., such factors as established
trade channels, market horizons customarily scanned, and the like), it
is not certain that distance is an ideal proxy, especially when, in some
goods, it has strong economic effects of a physical nature.
E
2 Editor'snote: These points also were stricken from the Gruber-Vernon paper
in response to criticism such as this.Comments 285
the Tariff barriers are ignored in both papers, although Gruber and Ver-
non include a variable for preferences, apparently on the assumption
that tariffs are otherwise uniform. This is a dubious omission, especially
the if one believes, with Hufbauer and Travis, that tariffs may be sufficiently
distortionary to account for the Leontief paradox.
lar On scale economies, Hufbauer did not consider the work of Jacques
nd Drèze in two interesting,important, but difficult-to-obtain papers.3
;is, Drèze observes that Belgium concentrates its production and exports on
in- standardizedproducts, not only by broad classes such as semifinished
ily iron and steel, flat glass, and photographic film, but within categories
es which vary in standardization. Thus Belgium produces white china, but
not colored or decorated (i.e., the standardized quality rather than the
m qualities subject to taste)and, within automobile components, such
Id products as standardized batteries, tires, windows, upholstery fabrics,
rt wiring harnesses and radiators, rather than engines, bodies, and their
components, which vary among producers, models, and countries. This
ci, extends Hufbauer's analysis, though he does not allow for production of
standardized products for export by small countries beyond mentioning
IS it. But Hufbauer is puzzled by the phenomenon which Drèze fails to
take into account, the specialization by Denmark, the Netherlands, and
g Sweden in scale-economy goods to a greater extent than their manu-
facturing output would justify. Switzerland could be added to this list,
if its trade had been covered. These countries are style-setters which
achieve their scale economies through exports. The attempt to identify
S scale economies with certain goods, and associate these goods with
- certainsize countries in exports, must be modified on two counts: first,
the possibility that small countries can achieve exports in scale-economy
goods where the standardization is set by large countries; and second,
the possibility that the differentiated products of small countries, such
as Dutch electrical equipment, Swedish machinery and telephones,
Danish furniture, and Swiss pharmaceuticals (but not Belgian products),
get accepted as the international standard.
But it is time to conclude. The Hufbauer and Gruber-Vernon papers,
See "Les exportations intra-C.E.E. en 1958 et Ia position beige," Recherches
Econorniquesde Louvain, 1961,and "Quelques réflexions sereines sur I'adaptation
de l'industrie beige au Marché Commun," Corn ptes Rendus des Travaux de la
Société Royale d'Econornie Politique de Belgique, No. 275, December 1960.
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for all the nitpicks of details I have produced, are surely in the right an
direction—that of empirical verification of the theory of trade overall
and on the average, even though contrary examples and exceptions
abound in the small.
Hufbauer and Gruber and Vernon differ in the evaluation of their va
overall findings. Gruber and Vernon find the persistent strength in
explaining trade of differences in human-resource development "a major nq
fresh conclusion." 'Hufbauercharacterizes his conclusion that physical-
capital and human-skill theories produce enviable results with little
IS
ad hoc manipulation or theoretical amplification "distressingly simple rel
and orthodox." One may wonder on the basis of the pioneering work of
Kenen and Keesing how fresh is the discovery of human resources as a
basis for trade. And a textbook writer who has just finished a new CXI








The Hufbauer and Gruber-Vernon papers are similar in that each
represents an imaginative effort to extend our understanding of the
factors that determine the commodity composition of international trade
in manufactures. They are alike also in the success each enjoyed in the U choice of explanatory variables, including one or two that might at
h
first blush appear rather unlikely.
q
Several of the explanatory variables in each paper represent factor
proportions of one sort or another such as capital-labor ratios in the
va
Hufbauer paper, the capital-output ratios in the Gruber-Vernon paper,
and the relative importance of highly qualified workers in both papers.
Other explanatory variables represent the economies of scale, such as
Hufbauer's elasticity of value aded with respect to the number of
employees per establishment. Still others reflect monopolistic elements
Editor's note: The final version of the paper is more modest in tone and does
not contain this reference.
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arisingeither from technological gaps, such as Hufbauer's measure of the
ght lateness of the appearance of each category of exports in trade, or result-
all ing from industrial concentration such as Gruber-Vernon's use of the
)flS concentration ratio. With one exception in the Hufbauer paper, the
values of each of the explanatory variables assigned to each export
eir category are derived from U.S. data; thus, it is assumed that there are
no factor reversals.
jor Another important assumption which the two papers have in common
a is that factor scarcities can be judged purely in physical terms without
reference to demand factors. In this respect they follow the practice
developed by Leontief in his famous paper suggesting the factor paradox
for U.S. trade, and their findings tend to confirm the fact that U.S.
a exports are not particularly intensive in physical capital. The expansion
W of the concept of capital to include human capital, suggested by Peter
Kenen and others, and the capitalized value of the knowledge produced
by R&D expenditure, recently suggested by Harry Johnson, will prob-
ably operate so as to increase the relative quantity of capital in the
U.S. economy and the relative quantity embodied in U.S. exports.
There is, however, a potentially important factor on the demand side
which has been overlooked and which would in a sense tend to place a
greater burden of explanation on these suggestions for broadening the
concept of the capital supply. It is the capital intensity of U.S. consump-
h tion patterns relative to that of foreign consumption patterns. Housing
e and durable goods, the consumption categories in which the excess of
U.S. over foreign per capita consumption tends to be largest, absorb
large amounts of capital. In 1958, the last date for which Goldsmith,
Lipsey, and Mendelson prepared a national balance sheet,1 nonfarm
households actually held tangible assets which in value were almost 30
per cent greater than those held by nonfinancial corporations, the
entities which presumably generated our manufactured exports. The
value of residential structures owned by nonfarm households was almost
twice the value of nonresidential structures held by nonfinancial cor-
porations, and consumers' durables were almost 15 per cent higher than
producers' durables held by nonfinancial corporations. This large house-
hold demand for capital must be taken into account in any assessment of
1 R. W. Goldsmith, R. E. Lipsey and M. Mendelson, Studies in the National
Balance Sheet of the United States, II, Princeton for NBER, 1963, pp. 68—69.
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relative factor scarcities in the U.S. economy compared to that of other H
countries. e4
There are of course differences as well as similarities in the approach
followed by the two papers. The authors of the two papers have, for
example, organized their data differently. The advantage of the Hufbauer
approach is that he uses a more detailed breakdown of exports
ahundred three-digit SITC groups.
Gruber and Vernon, on the other hand, set a much more demanding
test for themselves. In the first part of their paper, they seek to explain
the relative size of each country's exports of manufactures in terms of
their explanatory variables; that is, they correlate each country's export la
shares for each of the twenty-four industries with certain characteristics le
of each industry. (In the second part of their paper they correlate, for
each of the twenty-four industries, the size of the bilateral trade flows
of the exporting and importing partners with certain national character-
istics, or with differences in these characteristics.) Hufbauer works only ai
with successive correlations of the ranks of countries when they are
arrayed according to two different variables, one measuring the relative
amount of a given characteristic embodied in each country's total
exports of manufactures and the other measuring the amount of the h
corresponding national attribute found for each country.
A major disadvantage which both studies encounter, in common with
other empirical investigations of trade flows, is that the classifications ii
used for industrial production and international trade really are not q
relevant to the purposes at hand. Now it may be thought that this objec-
tion is not valid in view of the high degree of success of both papers in
explaining international trade flows by variables which are calibrated
in terms of the existing categories. However, there is no reason to believe ii
that the classifications are equally appropriate or equally inappropriate si
for each of the several explanatory variables. It is possible, for example,
that the categories may contain groups of products that are more homo-
geneous with respect, say, to the skill ratio than with respect to the
economies of scale. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the ii
classifications are particularly deficient for purposes of measuring econo-
mies of scale. Scale economies are a function not only of the size of
plant, which can be measured in terms of the existing classifications
and which Hufbauer does measure, but also of the product mix within
plants, which is more difficult to measure and which is omitted from
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her Hufbauer's net. In the case of the United States, at least, the scale
economies that are important in exports are often more a function of
ach the size of the market than of the size of plants or establishments. in
for the study of international price competitiveness that Robert Lipsey and
uer I have been conducting at the National Bureau,2 we have encountered
of a number of cases in which the size of the U.S. market enables U.S.
ps. producers to reach large volume production for relatively specialized
ing product variants for which markets are thin in any one of the smaller,
am competing economies. In the antifriction bearing industry, for example,
of the U.S. imports commonly used bearings which can be produced in
ort large volume both here and abroad, but the United States has neverthe-
ics less enjoyed a net export position in bearings owing to exports of
j specializedkinds capable of meeting precision needs, resisting heat or
ws rust, or bearing great weight.
Scale economies that may or may not be unique to the U.S. economy
tly
j alsoarise where there is a high degree of product specialization by each
ire of a large number of small firms. Brown and Rosenberg have reported
ye this situation as characterizing the machine tool industry;' each plant
tal type typically produced one or at most only several types out of the four
he hundred kinds of tools produced in the industry.
It may also be questioned whether either study has found a satis-
th factory measure of product differentiation. Hufbauer attempts, with great
ns ingenuity, to measure product differentiation in terms of the coefficient
ot of variation for U.S. export unit values to different destinations for each
C- ofhis three-digit categories of goods. However, even if we put aside the
in well-known erratic character of unit value data, export unit values to
various destinations may vary widely for a number of reasons not just
because of product differentiation. In the first place, a wide variety of
te standardized products may be found even in some of the seven-digit
e, classifications which Hufbauer uses to build up his three-digit measures,
and the product mix sent to different destinations may be different.
te Even a cursory check of U.S. 1965 export databrings up some sugges-
tive illustrations: unit values of exports to different destinations for
f
2PriceCompetitiveness in World Trade, Chap. 2, forthcoming.
M. Brown and N. Rosenberg, "Prologue to a Study of Patent and Other
Factors in the Machine Tool Industry," The Patent, Trademark and Copyright
n Journal of Research and Education, Spring 1960, p. 45.
4U.S.Department of Commerce, U.S. Exports, Commodity by Country, FT
410, December 1965.
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"screws, rivets, washers, and similar articles of iron or steel" (Schedule
B commodity number 6942130) ranged from 22.6 cents per pound (to G$
Korea) to $4.26 per pound (Greece), while for "industrial sewing vel
machines except shoe sewing machines, new" (7173030) the range went de
from $214 (to Salvadore) to $988 (to Vietnam) per unit; the coefficients ot
of variation were 0.74 for screws, etc. and 0.52 for industrial sewing
machines.Itis rather doubtful that these differences in range and
variation of the unit values to different destinations reflect the relative
impact upon these two categories of the product cycle. Secondly the
seven-digit classification sometimes includes used machinery along with Eu
new, as in the printing machinery categories (7182210 to 7182960 inc.), of
and in other instances it provides separate categories for used equip- to
ment, as in industrial sewing machinery (7173040). Thus, the coefficient tiq
of variation is sometimes affected by the extent to which used machinery irni
is exported to some destinations and new machinery to others, and it arq
cannot be assumed that the relative importance of second-hand products
is the same from one category to another. Finally, price discrimination to
as between different destinations, which is not unknown even in U.S.
export trade, would also affect unit values. spi
The a priori doubts about the adequacy of the standardization coeffi-
cient are reinforced by an examination of the way in which the coefficient
ranks the three-digit groups. While the author is correct in saying "rea- re!
sonable coefficients seem to emerge, at least in some instances," there exi
are many that appear to be unreasonable. According to this measure, at
for example, office machinery (SITC 714) and agricultural machinery in
(712) are more standardized than zinc (686) and paper and paper-
board (641). A perusal of Hufbauer's Table A-2 will show that such
outcomes are not uncommon.
It is possible, however, that the significant correlation between the
ranks of the various countries with respect to their export-weighted is
coefficients of variation for export unit values and their ranks with an1
respect to manufacturing sophistication(as measured by GDP per
capita) has another important meaning. It may reflect the greater trii
variety of goods available in high income countries rather than measur- thi
ing the extent to which sophisticated countries are able to offer differ-
entiated products.
Putting this implication aside for the moment, it is worth pointing outComments 291 T ule that an important new line of investigation is suggested explicitly by the
(to Gruber-Vernon paper and implicitly by Hufbauer's paper, although not
ing very much explored in either. In the empirical and theoretical work
ent dealing with the commodity composition of trade over the past twenty
ats or twenty-five years, the main effort has been devoted to the search
for explanations of the contrasting trade patterns of different countries.
nd Gruber and Vernon remind us that something can be learned by studying
ye the similarities of trading patterns; perhaps we have given inadequate
he attention to the difference between tradeable goods and home goods.
th Economists of a former generation used to describe the characteristics
of traded goods in three terms: homogeneous, high in value in relation
to bulk, and in universal demand. Perhaps technological progress, par-
ticularly the reduction of the cost of transport, has altered the restrictive
impact of all three of these characteristics upon the kinds of goods that
it are traded. Perhaps with the spread of industrial production and with
ts higher real income levels, differentiated goods are as prone or more prone
to be traded than homogeneous products.
S. Although the point about homogeneous versus differentiated goods is
speculative, the similarity of export patterns of the main manufacturing
i- countriesisclearly shown by the Gruber-Vernon correlations. This
it similarity of export patterns is not dependent on the use of twenty-four
1- relativelylarge industrial categories but persists, I have found, when the
e exports of manufactures of the major industrial countries are correlated
at the three-digit level (about 100 categories); the Spearman coefficients
y in the matrix of correlations involving the United States, the United
- Kingdom,Germany, and Japan range from .54 to
What is the significance of these similarities? One possibility is that
all advanced manufacturing countries tend to produce highly similar
baskets of goods and to export them to nonmanufacturing countries. It
I is true that there are striking similarities in the structure of production
among the important manufacturing countries; for example, the Spear-
man coefficient for the rank correlation between nineteen two-digit indus-
tries is 0.72 for Japan and the United States and 0.83 for Germany and
the United States.6
Using OECD data on 1964 exports.
6 Based on data in United Nations, The Growth of World Industry, 1953—65,
New York, 1967.
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Such an explanation cannot, however, be more than part of the story,
since, as is well known, intratrade among the industrial countries is
quite important. Indeed, in 1964, half of U.S. and U.K. manufactures in
exportsand three-quarters of Germany's went to OECD countries.T in
Conceivably, for purposes of this intratrade, each major industrial
country might specialize in a different group of industries, but this seems
unlikely in view of the similarities in the industrial composition of their
exports. Also, a direct check of a single case, U.S. and German intra-
trade, indicates a significant degree of similarity in the industrial pattern al
of each country's exports to the other; the Spearman coefficient was .53
for eighty-six three-digit categories for which OECD data for 1964 ta
exports were available. This coefficient, which is significant at the 1 per
cent confidence level, leaves room for some industry specialization, but
it also indicates a considerable amount of what looks like cross exporting.
It is possible that a better explanation of this trade might come from
a comparison of the economic characteristics of home goods and trade- el
able goods. Neither of these papers tells us, for example, whether the
goods that are generally exported in relatively large volume by the major
manufacturing countries are particularly capital-intensive, or unusually
subject to the economies of scale as compared to goods that are exporte4
in smaller volume. Neither do they indicate whether there are differences ai
between the economic characteristics of the manufactures the industrial
countries export to one another and those they send to other destina-
tions. Until we have the answers to questions like these, we shall not
fully understand the forces that determine the commodity composition of
trade.
Meanwhile, it is possible to outline a hypothesis to explain this intra-
trade that can be viewed in one sense as an extension of the availability
argument I offered some years ago; 8thatis, trade consists to a significant
degree of products, or still more importantly, of product variants that
are not available in the recipient country. Before drawing on the Gruber-
Vernon and Hufbauer papers to suggest why this occurs, I may call
attention to two bits of evidence (both reported in the forthcoming
See alsoH.Grubel, "Intra-Industry Specialization and the Pattern of Grade,"
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, August 1967.
8"'Availability'and Other Influences on the Commodity Composition of C
Trade," Journal of Political Economy, April 1956. NComments 293
tory study by Lipsey and me) that indicate that the availability factor does
operate for manufactures and particularly for machinery, as business-
tures men perceive the situation. The first suggests that U.S. exports of metal
products and machinery depend to a considerable extent upon differ-
;trial ences in design and other aspects of product differentiation. The second
is a survey by the IFO Institute of Munich in which German firms that
their purchased foreign factory equipment reported that 63 per cent of their
itra- purchases were due to the fact that the desired equipment was not avail-
tern able at home; another 12 per cent was purchased because of the
.53 superiority of foreign equipment; and only 7 per cent for price advan-
964 tages.
per Some of the reasons underlying the availability of different products
but or product variants in various supplying countries are found in the tech-
ing. nological gap or in the kind of product differentiation along national
lines (Belgian lace, French wine, British china, etc.) which I mentioned
tde- earlier. In addition, the combination of an increase in the variety of
the products—for producers' goods as well as for consumer goods—and the
tjor economies of long production runs may result in specialization by prod-
ally uct variant rather than by industry or type of product.
ted Although economies of long production runs explain why countries
Ces are led to concentrate on a limited range of products, even when they
rial are capable of producing the full range, the determination of the par-
na- ticular variants each country will specialize in depends on systematic as
riot well as random factors. In general, the larger the market the wider the
of range of products for which the country will be able to obtain the econo-
mies of long runs,9 and the more likely itis to be able to export a
ra- variety of materials and equipment catering to specialized needs which
It)T have a demand extensive enough to warrant production beyond the
tnt handicraft, custom, or special-order stage and yet infrequent enough to
tat prevent the attainment of scale economies in smaller markets.
A country with a small home market would specialize in the less
rig
esoteric and more widely demanded products in which it could achieve
A recent study of the Canadian economy shows the cost disadvantages that
ensue from the attempt to produce a wide range of product variants in a small
market. See D. J. Daly, B. A. Keys, and F. J. Spence, Scale and Specialization in
of Canadian Manufacturing, Staff Study No. 21, Economic Council of Canada,
March 1968.
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long production runs; this has been pointed out by Drèze who has
a"standardization" hypothesis to explain Belgium's export
pattern in which semimanufactures are important.'° poss
As between countries with the same size market, the one with greater dcvi
physical and human capital might provide the leadership in developing capi
new variants, losing its comparative advantage in each new variant as
it became more widely used in the other country. As between countries
equal in market size and in physical and human capital, the pattern of coni
specialization in the production of different variants in long runs might and
depend on systematic elements such as differences in tastes and natural I
resource endowments or on chance factors. all i
An important systematic element is the tendency for domestic produc-
tion in each country to consist of product variants that cater to the a v
tastes and needs of the home market. Drèze and (I think) Linder, among be
others, have seen this trade-creating aspect of product differentiation emi
chiefly in connection with consumers goods. Lipsey and I have been coC
struck in the course of our National Bureau study with a number of suc
examples of a similar phenomenon in connection with producers' goods. flo
Equipment is usually designed in each country to meet local conditions suc
such as the usual scale of output and the prevailing relative factor prices. Lii
In each country, however, there is apt to be a small demand for equip-
ment which is different from that which serves most local needs. This Ta
small demand can be better satisfied by equipment designed for condi- aft
tions that happen to prevail in another country. European equipment
for such industries as printing, baking, and pharmaceuticals, for example,
is designed for smaller volume, lower speed, and greater versatility than
American equipment for the same industries. In each area most domestic is
needs are met by domestic production, but Americans do import some pa
low-volume versatile machines from Europe and export some high-
volume specialized machines to Europe.
Obviously, this basis for specialization is closely related to the dis- th
economies of small-scale production or of special orders. However, one
th
10JacquesDrèze, "Quelques réflexions sereines sur l'adaptation de l'industrie c4
Beige au Marché Commun," Corn ptes rendus des Travaux de Ia Sociélé Royale
d'Econornie Politique de Belgique, No. 275, December 1960.-
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has may suppose that the ability of a country to participate in this trade,
particularly in sectors of rapidly changing technique, is related to its
possession of the attributes which are required for the production and
tter development of special designs of equipment—viz., physical and human
ing capital, particularly R&D skills.
as An explanation along these lines is consistent with the similarity of
ies export profiles found by Gruber and Vernon, the associations between
of commodity characteristics and national attributes stressed by Hufbauer,
gin and the importance of intratrade pointed out above.
ral This is not to claim that specialization by product variant can explain
all intraindustrial country trade flows in manufactures. The truth prob-
ably is that manufactures move across international boundaries owing to
lie a variety of causes. Some—and probably a significant fraction—can
ng be explained in terms of the classical factor proportions theory. The
on emergence of textile exports from developing countries, despite hostile
en commercial policies by the developed countries, may be a reflection 'of
such tendencies. Other flows are due to favorable financing, to past
flows (parts for machinery, extensions of past installations of systems
'ns such as railroad, electrical, and telephone), and to speed of delivery.
es. Lipsey and I are inclined to the view that the importance of delivery
p- speed in accounting for U.S. exports has not been given sufficient weight.
To take an extreme example, the United States was able to export ships
Ii- after the Suez Crisis in 1957 despite prices that were perhaps double
those abroad. This suggests, as do some of our authors' results, that the
Ic, factors that are important in explaining one country's trade may differ
an from those that loom large in explaining another country's, and that there
tic is some evidence that the main forces at work in influencing U.S. trade
tie patterns in particular tend to differ from those operating in other coun-
tries.
Doubtless other explanations and hypotheses about the meaning of
is- . theresults that have placed before us by Gruber and Vernon and
ne Hufbauer will be forthcoming. Their work has broken new ground in
the effort to understand the factors that determine the commodity
composition of trade. They have, to amend slightly the words of one of
the papers, provided valuable grist for the mill of theory.296 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns
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Although the papers presented at the conference fall within the realm of
the "pure theory" of international trade, it appears that various speakers
address themselves to three different questions, to wit: (1) an assess- It!
ment of the gains from international trade (Arrow); (2) an explanation the
of the commodity composition of trade (Hufbauer, and Gruber and tic
Vernon); and (3) the development of a guide for trade policy for pei
individual nations, particularly within a development context (Bruno).
These are certainly not mutually exclusive, and an "ideal" theory
should contain answers to all three. But within an empirical context, ph
one would be doing well to test for one or two of them at a time. The
following remarks are addressed to the Hufbauer and Gruber-Vernon cal
papers on the supposition that their main objective is to explain the
commodity composition of international trade.
In the received theory of exchange both supply and demand play a
role in the process of price determination. Translated into the (barter)
theory of international trade—based on the doctrine of comparative
advantage—we find supply factors determining the boundaries to
mutually beneficial trade and demand considerations determining the
commodity terms of trade within these boundaries. But the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, as tested by Leontief and in the vast literature that ensued,
assumes away international differences in demand. Likewise, most of eli
the theories tested in these two papers are exclusively of the supply thil
variety. cx
In actual fact, supply models can be expected to explain rather well tn
the portion of world trade that consists of homogeneous commodities. fal
When it comes to industrial products, which constitute the bulk of trade ca
among the developed countries, the patterns of demand and the degree ge
to which they are influenced by product differentiation can be expected
to play an important role. None of the models tested here can shed light
on the mutual exchange of Fiats, Renaults, and Volkswagens among the bd
three major EEC countries. On a priori grounds, supply factors would
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dominatetrade relationships only when they result in a price differential
large enough to swamp the demand effects in monopolistically com-
petitive markets. Consequently, it would make sense to test the supply
models only for these commodities which differ substantially in the
product characteristic being tested. This brings me to the next opera-
tional suggestion.
i of The papers under discussion are of immense value in analyzing the
:ers various characteristics of commodity groups entering international trade.
It would have been preferable to carry out such an analysis for each of
ion the five-digit SITC categories; but evidently this is precluded on prac-
nd tical grounds. Now, by running multiple regressions and adding inde-
for pendent variables, one can certainly increase the portion of the variance
)). beingexplained. But as this process progresses, the theory loses opera-
)ry tional simplicity and therefore practical significance. The logical sim-
xt, plicity of a theory (like that of the Heckscher-Ohlin model) has a value
lie which should be preserved even while the theory is made more sophisti-
cated. Moreover, even by employing dozens of variables, we may not
he reach satisfactory explanations of all trade by all countries.
I would therefore like to suggest an alternative method of using the
• a data gathered in the papers. As a first stage we wish to test the explana-
r) tory power of each commodity characteristic by relating it to the respec-
ye tive structure of the economy. (Incidentally, this link is missing in the
to first half of the Gruber-Vernon paper because the country-endowments
he counterpart of each industry characteristic is not given.) Assume, for
example, that we start by testing the factor proportions model. I pro-
d, pose that we rank all commodity groups by capital per man and then
of eliminate from the test, say, a fifth of the industries which fall right in
the middle. Better cut-off points can perhaps be decided upon after an
examination of the data; but any decision would of necessity be arbi-
trary. We test the theory with the industries at the two ends.—those
S. falling in two groups that contrast sharply with each other in terms of
le capital per worker—thus generating a powerful "supply effect." Homo-
geneous products can perhaps be included even if they fall in the middle
group.
it One can proceed in the same fashion with the other characteristics to
be tested; namely, by excluding the respective "middle group" and test-
ing the theory for those industries which differ considerably from each
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other. A theory that cannot explain trade in its own "end group" meas
products can be discarded. addd
Subsequently, in order to compare the relative effectiveness of the
theories, an iterative process can be employed. For each commodity be
characteristic one can start from the two ends and work toward the char
middle by adding industries, until the explanation loses power. The to
characteristic that explains a larger share of world trade is presumably
the superior one. From there we can proceed with a theoretical and broal
empirical approach based on reasonable combinations of the character-
istics which came out well in the tests. apply
In sum, what is suggested here is that instead of attempting an
explanation of all trade using a multiplicity of variables, it might be mani
better to try to explain a portion of total trade by a simple theory. But givet
instead of deleting a country, as Hufbauer has done, it is proposed here
to exclude commodities. It is reasonable to expect that much of the baue
unexplained portion would be due to differences in demand patterns
under monopolistically competitive conditions, and unexplainable by
supply models.
Having completed this stage of the analysis, one can embark on two
alternative courses. The first course would involve merging the explana- T
tory factors that came out well into a composite variable on grounds anali
that make theoretical sense. Hufbauer's suggestion of neofactor propor- emts
tions and neotechnology variables come to mind in this connection. And,
if necessary, the relative explanatory power of the competing composite
variables can be assessed by the same iterative procedure outlined above.
The second alternative is to incorporate in the theory different explana- to
tions for trade in different types of commodities. Such a result might prod
emerge if the various factors were equally powerful in explaining trade ing I
in different, but distinct, types of goods. into
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In the concluding summary of that part of his paper concerned with
the "nature of trade," Hufbauer refers to the explanatory power of aComments 299
measure I have employed elsewhere 1 to explain trade flows—i.e., value
added per employee as an index of the combined inputs of physical and
the human capital into different manufacturing industries. It may therefore
be useful to add this composite variable to Hufbauer's list of product
the characteristics embodied in exports and imports and to relate the results
The to whichever of his national attributes seems most appropriate.2 Gross
ably domestic product per capita commends itself for this purpose, given the
and broad content of value added by manufacture.
Table 1gives the average value added per employee obtained by
applying U.S. coefficients for different industries to the product corn-
an position of each of the twenty-four countries' exports and imports of
be manufactures. When the export series (of primary interest for reasons
But given by Hufbauer) is matched with GDP per capita, the following
tere correlations are obtained (comparable to those given in Table 5 of Huf-
the bauer's paper):
Tfls Rank correlations, unweighted
by 24 countries .765
23countries (Mexico excluded) .871
wo Rank correlation, weighted .928
na- These results compare favorably with those given by Hufbauer's skill
ids analysis, being distinctly higher than the correlations with skill ratios
or- embodied in trade and slightly lower than the correlations with wage
ad, rates. Conceptually, the value-added criterion seems more appealing. As
ate Harry Johnson says in his paper in this volume, "it picks up not only the
ye. neofactor proportion elements of material and human capital, but also
to some extent the neotechnology elements of scale economies, and of
product age and differentiation, insofar as these last are reflected in sell-
ing prices." This may be true of still other inputs of "intellectual capital"
into the production process.
1 imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries, New York, NBER,
1968. As explained there (pages 21—22), "Differences from industry to industry in
value added per employee are here assumed to measure differences in the aggregate
flows of services from the factors of production employed in the manufacturing
process (and exclude therefore indirect factor inputs such as materials used).
It is further assumed that these services may be ascribed either to human capital
or to physical capital, and that, in interindustry comparisons, the wage-and.salary
part of value added is a good proxy for the first and the remainder of value added
a good proxy for the second."
th 2 1 am grateful to Professor Hufbauer for his interest in this exercise and for
putting his basic trade data at my disposal and grateful also to his assistant,
a Melissa Patterson, for doing the computations.300 Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns
TABLE 1
Value Added by Manufacture per Employee, Embodied in 1965 Exports
and Imports and GDP Per Capita, Twenty-Four Countries
GDP
Value AddedPer Employee Per
Capita Exports Imports
Canada 14,671(2) 13,820(12) 2,110(2)
United States 14,340(4) 13,079 (21) 3000(1)
Austria 12,319 (15) 13747 (13) 1,030 (13.5)
Belgium 13,235 (10) 13,529 (15) 1460 (10)
Denmark 12,346 (14) 13,492 (16) 1,680(8)
France 14,071(6) 14,239(7) 1,580(9)
Germany 14,276(5) 13,265 (19) 1,770(6)
Italy 12,572 (13) 14,709(3) 1,030 (13.5)
Netherlands 13.469(9) 13,332 (18) 1,430(11)
Norway 1:3,721(7) 12,465 (22) 1,880(4)
Sweden 13,196 (11) 13,429 (17) 2,100(3)
United Kingdom 13,715(8) 13,209 (20) 1,710(7)
Australia 14,397(3) 13,893 (11) 1,810(5)
Japan 11,880 (16) 15,212(2) 720 (15)
Israel 8,841 (21) 12,227 ('24) 1,090 (12)
Portugal 9,813 (19) 14,102(9) 420 (iS)
Spain 13,116 (12) 14,403(5) 550 (16)
Yugoslavia 11,564 (18) 14,211(8) 250 (19)
Mexico 15,909(1) 15,500(1) 430(17)
Hong Kong 7,845 (24) 12,418 (23) 200 (20)
India 8,634 (22) 13,637 (14) 80(23.5)
Korea 9,084 (20) 14,508 (14) 140 (21)
Pakistan S,157 (23) 13,918 (10) 80 (23.5)
























(in dollars; rank order given in parentheses)
Source: Value-added averages are obtained by applying coefficients
derived from U.S. 1963 Census of Manufactures (converted to SITC in
accordance with Hufbauer's Table A1)to the percentage distribution of
each country's exports or imports among the 102 three-digit SITC
categories usedinHufbauer's analysis. The GDP series istaken








Aswould be expected, the import series in Table 1is negatively
related to GDP per capita, though much less strongly than exports.3
arts
Mostcountries with high average value added in exports show the
opposite for imports, and vice versa. It is particularly noteworthy that,
on this more comprehensive definition of capital inputs, the export
average is distinctly higher than the import average for the United States.
This result—not surprising in the light of previous findings by Kravis,
Keesing and others relevant to the skill content of exports and imports—
— suggeststhat a basic flaw in the Leontief paradox was reliance on an
inadequate physical concept of capital.
Mexico and Israel stand out as the most deviant countries, the first
with a much higher, the second a much lower, average value added in
exports than their GDP per capita would lead one to expect. Hufbauer
has already commented on the reasons for Israel's behavior. That of
Mexico is strongly influenced by the fact that nonferrous metals and
5) certain pharmaceuticals and chemicals—all strongly resource-oriented—
make up more than half of its exports of manufactures according to
Hufbauer's grouping. itt a ranking excluding all nonferrous metals and
chemicals, Mexico falls to fifteenth place in exports on the value-added
criterion.4 As Hufbauer indicates, there is reason to look critically at
his coverage of "manufactures." The same question arises with regard
to the Gruber-Vernon selection, which contains even more essentially
resource-oriented items.
The computations given here on value added per employee may be
criticized,as the Hufbauer and Gruber-Vernon computations have
been, because of the use of American coefficients. Strong similarities
across countries in the pattern of value added per employee according
5) to industry make me doubt that this is, in fact, a major weakness in
the But, clearly, there is room for further empirical work
using and comparing other countries' coefficients.
— The simple correlation is —.407compared with .668 for exports.
4Theunweighted rank correlations obtained on this basis (.8 56 for all twenty-
four countries and .9185 with one country, Israel, omitted) are higher than those
reported above for all products in Flufbauer's selection, but the weighted correla-
lion (.914)is slightly lower. More study, however, needs to be given to the
.2 criteria of selection and, in particular, to the identification and exclusion of indus-
tries whose location is determined mainly by natural resources rather than by
labor, capital, technology, or other factors.
See Chapter 3, "International Comparisons of Factor Intensities," in Imports
of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries.